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1. Introduction
Conceptions of pictorial realism abound, and perhaps only a
philosopher would fret over such abundance as is to be found
in this symposium. Saying that Abell, Armstrong, and McMahon
offer us three accounts of three different phenomena rather
than three competing accounts of one or two phenomena
seems to give up the search for systematic and unifying
explanations. Art is a messy business, however, and we should
not seek more order in our explanations than there is in the
world. So let's first look at the many apparently distinct notions
of pictorial realism, and then weigh the prospects for house
cleaning.
2. Special Realism
There may be as many conceptions of pictorial realism as there
are attributions of it. Just think of the many contexts in which
pictorial realism is attributed, which run from informal chat
about pictures to the formal discourses of art criticism, art
history, and art theory. Some of these attributions are
obviously idiosyncratic. (I was recently asked, as a member of
a jury, to award a special prize for "realism," which turned out
to mean "landscape.") Setting aside the idiosyncrasies, here
are several theoretically robust conceptions of realism.
One Realism. McMahon thinks of all pictures as realistic. Their
realism distinguishes them from other kinds of representations,
notably linguistic descriptions. Thus Brueghel's painting of the
fall of Icarus is realistic in a way that William Carlos William's
description of the very same scene is not, just because the
former but not the latter is a picture. Of course, not every
property of pictures that we are interested in has to do with
representation: the view is that pictures are realistic as
representations. Moreover, pictures may represent by a
mixture of pictorial and other means (even linguistic means),
so the view is that pictures are realistic as pictorial
representations. On this conception, pictorial realism is not a
matter of degree. "Realistic" modifies a kind of representation -
depiction.
An account of realism so conceived is an account of depiction,
and that is what McMahon proposes. P depicts O as F only if its
surface is seen as an F configuration. For example,
Rembrandt's drawing depicts something as a boat only if its
surface is seen as a boat configuration. What configuration is
seen depends on sub-personal mental processing that uses an
object-centered (rather than view-pointed) description in iconic
memory. The surface is seen to have a different configuration if
a different object-centered description is used. So there may be
many ways to depict O as F: many differently marked surfaces
may be seen as F configurations, for it is an empirical matter
what object-centered descriptions are stored in iconic memory.
Moreover, we learn to see new configurations when new
object-centered descriptions are added to memory.
Slow-Dawning Realism. McMahon also observes that realism
may dawn slowly. A picture may look unrealistic for quite some
time until its realism comes into sight. McMahon proposes that
her account explains this phenomenon: we are let in on a
picture's realism as we acquire the object-centered description
that enables us to see the required configuration. However, we
need not assume that only One Realism dawns slowly. The
reception of Impressionism illustrates the phenomenon of
Slow-Dawning Realism, if we are to believe the usual story.
According to that story, Impressionist pictures looked at first
quite unrealistic but now they look highly realistic. It is
implausible, however, that their initial audience failed to see
the configurations of boulevards, umbrellas, dancers, and
flowers that they present. Slow-Dawning Realism is
independent of One Realism.
One Gradual Realism. One Realism may be amended to yield a
conception of realism that comes in degrees. Distinguish
pictorial content - the properties a picture depicts a scene as
having - from design - the properties of a picture's surface
(partly) in virtue of which it has its pictorial content. Now
distinguish design from surface tout court. Some surface
properties of some pictures are not design properties: these
properties of a picture might vary as pictorial content remains
the same. Some are not at all representational (e.g. the
scratches across some of Rembrandt's etchings), while others
represent non-pictorially (e.g. the text in a cartoon thought
balloon). Given this apparatus, we may say that some pictures
are the more realistic the fewer non-design surface properties
they have or the larger the ratio of design surface to non-
design surface. The idea is that in more realistic pictures the
resources of the medium are more completely directed to
depiction.
Lifelike Realism. One Realism, whether gradual or not, is a
feature of all pictures, in so far as they depict. Armstrong
outlines a conception of realism according to which only a very
few pictures are highly realistic. These pictures depict things as
having features that give them a lifelike appearance, "features
which are central to our encounters with real objects." Think of
these as the features that distinguish the appearance of the
real from the appearance of the unreal. Armstrong proposes
that the features are visual detail, weight and solidity, and
vitality and motion. Of course, one might accept the general
characterization of Lifelike Realism as the depiction of features
which are central to encounters with the real and either reject
Armstrong's list or accept it as one of several equally good lists
of features which support Lifelike Realism.
Uncanny Realism is an interesting phenomenon made available
by tweaking the parameters of Lifelike Realism. Some pictures
achieve Lifelike Realism by depicting things as having some but
not all of the features characteristic of our encounters with real
objects. When taken to an extreme, as when enormous gaps in
visual detail are combined with the depiction of weight, solidity,
vitality, and motion, the apparently real is apparently unreal,
and that is uncanny.
Illusionistic Realism. A picture that is realistic in this sense can
be viewed in conditions where it is indistinguishable from the
scene it depicts. However, Lifelike Realism does not imply
Illusionistic Realism. First, Lifelike Realism is achieved by
depicting things as having some properties salient in our
encounters with things, and that is consistent with not
depicting things as having all the properties they are seen to
have in the flesh. Lifelike Realism, especially in its Uncanny
variety, may result from a few deft strokes of the pen. Second,
Lifelike Realism is a matter of what features scenes are
depicted as having, not of how they are depicted. One might
depict weight and solidity by marks that always betray the
process of depiction.
Idolic Realism, Realism in Looking. E. H. Gombrich
characterizes realism not as a property of pictures but rather as
a transaction between pictures and their spectators.[1] The idol
was made to stand in for the god and is therefore to be treated
as the god. Put another way, the idol mandates that spectators
imagine that the space they occupy is one where the god also
sits. That is a kind of realism - a taking for real. Its
complement is a kind of realism in which the depicted scene is
placed in a space apart, available for scrutiny. One no more
scrutinizes the idol than one would scrutinize the god himself,
but the realism of much painting after the Renaissance requires
and builds upon an intense looking that is inappropriate except
in pictures.
True Realism. Some pictures serve as sources of information. A
picture is realistic to the extent that it accurately informs us
about the appearance of the scene it depicts: its content is
accurate. That is True Realism.
Informative Realism. I may speak the truth and fail to inform,
as we learned from Paul Grice; and, likewise, an accurate
picture may fail to inform because it does not convey
information that is relevant in the circumstances. I am right to
deem as uninformative the perfectly accurate stick figure you
drew when I asked you what David Lewis looks like. Abell
proposes an account of Informative Realism. Pictures are
realistic to the extent that they are informative about the
appearance of scenes, where informativeness implies
relevance. Information is relevant to a thinker to the extent
that it yields new information when added to information she
already has. An informative picture of Lewis added to some
perceptual information yields the new information that Lewis is
in the corner arguing with Kripke. The stick figure does not
yield this new information; it is less informative, hence less
realistic.
Revelatory Realism. Informative realism begets another
realism.[2] Some pictures convey information that cannot be
gathered visually, for example, pictures of tiny, gigantic, and
inaccessible objects, and also pictures that depict scenes as
having combinations of properties they could not be seen to
have. These pictures may add to our store of information in
eye-opening ways. They are revelatory, informative in relevant
and also surprising ways.
Suppose that each of these conceptions of realism has a place
in some theorizing about pictures. We then have at least ten
viable conceptions of special realism, and there may be more.
Whatever the number, it is multiplied if we accept certain
theses.
Stylistic Realism. Is realism attributable only to individual
pictures? Maybe not. According to Stylistic Realism, realism is a
property of pictorial styles, as well as individual pictures. A
style is a picture kind whose instances share a mode of
representation or a kind of content. Abell accepts Stylistic
Realism. Any realism in our list can be construed stylistically,
with the exception of One Realism. Take One Gradual Realism
and construe styles as kinds of pictures individuated by surface
determinables, for example, monochromatic and polychromatic
pictures are two styles. Some styles are the more realistic the
larger the average ratio of design surface to non-design
surface features of their members. The polychromatic style is
more realistic than the monochromatic style.
Relative Realism. Are attributions of any special realism
uniform across contexts? Relative Realism holds that realism is
relative to context of use. Abell accepts this also, for what is
relevant depends on the state of the spectator - information in
P is relevant to S. It is also predicted by McMahon's account of
One Realism if users differ in picture-reading skills - that is, if
they have different object-centered descriptions in iconic
memory and so see different configurations in picture surfaces.
Lifelike Realism requires a specification of the features that are
central in our encounters with real objects. Do those features
vary historically or culturally? If they do, then incompatible
attributions of Lifelike Realism are true in different contexts.
Thus Armstrong's account is also consistent with Relative
Realism.
Normative Realism. Does the realism of a picture or a style of
picture number among its merits or demerits? According to
Normative Realism, to attribute realism to P is sometimes to
attribute a (de)merit to P. It is implausible that calling a picture
realistic is always to praise it; realism is a failing in some
pictures. Moreover, it is implausible that judgments of realism
are always normative. Normative Realism is thus a weak thesis
and it is easy to think of cases suggesting its truth.
The special realisms multiply if some apply to styles as well
pictures, relativize to context of application, or come in
normative as well as descriptive versions. Many realisms
indeed!
3. General Realism
The more we multiply the special realisms, the worse appear to
be the prospects for a general conception of pictorial realism.
Such a conception can be achieved in two ways: the way of
contention or the way of abduction.
The way of contention seeks reasons to reject one conception
of realism if it is inconsistent with another. One conception of
pictorial realism is inconsistent with another just in case
attributing the one to any picture precludes attributing the
other to the same picture. Theoretical considerations must
decide between them. However, Rembrandt's Canal with a
Rowing Boat,below, discussed by Armstrong, is a good
candidate for realism on many counts. Granted, one might
attribute more of one kind of realism to the Rembrandt than
another (little Idolic Realism, for example, and much Realism in
Looking) but that falls short of inconsistency. Many realisms
peacefully co-exist; the way of contention is a dead end.
Rembrandt, A Canal with a Rowing Boat, pen and ink drawing.
This image is used with the permission of Chatsworth Photo Library.
Any form of reproduction, transmission, performance, display,
rental, lending or storage in any retrieval system without the
written consent of the copyright holders is prohibited.
The way of abduction begins with the assumption that
"realism" is a theoretical concept, that attributions of realism
are attempts to explain something. With that assumption in
place, the next step is to see what needs explaining. The
conception of realism that does the best explanatory job is the
one to prefer.
It is not hard to read off the description of each special realism
what explanatory work it is expected to perform, and it is not
hard to see that no single explanandum is a strong attractor
for all special realisms. Each of the following facts needs
explaining: (1) depiction is a distinct type of representation, (2)
pictures afford experiences with a distinctive phenomenology,
(3) there are many styles of depiction, (4) styles of depiction
change over time in a non-arbitrary way, and (5) some
pictures are better than other pictures for certain tasks.
This is progress, at least in so far as the list of five explananda
is shorter than the list of special realisms. Moreover, it makes
sense to group the explananda by their explanantia. Theories
of depiction typically target (1) and (2) together. Some
theories give accounts of (1) in terms of the phenomenology of
pictures,[3] while others propose accounts of (1) which merely
suggest accounts of the phenomenology of pictures.[4] As Abell
makes clear, Gombrich's "riddle of style" builds on the
conjunction of (3), (4), and (5).[5] Pictures come in many
styles and styles change over time. Is that because different
styles serve different tasks? But all pictures serve to represent
appearances! Gombrich has a non-epistemic solution to the
riddle; Abell and Lopes have solutions that stress the different
contributions pictures can make to what we can know by
representing appearances. Finally, accounts of the value of
pictures as mimetic representations address (2) and (5)
together.[6]
Where is each special realism on this map of explanations and
explananda? One Realism and perhaps One Gradual Realism
are concerned with (1) and so with theories of depiction.
Lifelike Realism, Uncanny Realism, Realism in Looking, Idolic
Realism, Illusionistic Realism, and Revelatory Realism are
concerned with different ways of understanding (2) and so with
theories of depiction and the mimetic value of pictures. True
Realism, Informative Realism, Revelatory Realism, and Stylistic
Realism are concerned with (3), (4), and (5) and hence with
the informative properties of pictures.
There is more order to the topic of realism than one might
have expected just on the basis of listing the special realisms,
but there is not enough order to shorten the way of abduction.
Each notion of realism has a place in at least one of three
explanatory enterprises and is not in direct competition with
every other notion. Even when two appear to figure in the
same enterprise, they may divide their labour. For example,
Lifelike Realism and Illusionistic Realism spotlight different
elements of the phenomenology of our experiences of pictures,
so maybe we need both to explain (2) and the mimetic value
of pictures. The way of abduction is long and winding.
We may draw some lessons that will help see how to go
forward. First, any special realism is to be treated as an
explanatory concept. An analysis of it should look above all to
the explanatory work it does. Second, there may be many
explanatory jobs to do, requiring many realisms. Third, some
realisms may compete to perform the same job. Then we may
hire the better candidate. Fourth, the explanations that call for
notions of realism set the job descriptions we should use in
evaluating the candidates.
The fourth lesson is especially important. For example, sizing
up notions of realism for explanations of the phenomenology of
our experiences of pictures means itemizing what we need from
an account of (2). A great deal has been written about (2),
which may be brought to bear on the choice between, say,
Illusionistic and Lifelike Realism. Likewise, sizing up notions of
realism that for explanations of (3), (4), and (5) means getting
into the epistemic role of pictures - something that
philosophers have only just begun to do. Realism is not a topic
for study in isolation from theories of pictures.
We need not choose between reading the papers in this
symposium as disconnected takes on fundamentally different
phenomena or as competitors vying for a place in a unified field
theory of realism. Taken together, they raise hard but
worthwhile questions about what we need to know about
pictures: not just depiction, but also the uses and values of
pictures. A good way to begin to address those questions is to
attend to the abundant attributions of pictorial realism.
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